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Lifting the joint venture veil: liability of related entities for misleading conduct of 
agents engaged by joint venture partners 
 
Professor Sharon Christensen and Professor Bill Duncan  
 
 At common law, a corporation may be liable vicariously for the conduct of its 
appointed agents, employees or directors. This generally requires the agent or 
employee to be acting in the course of his or her agency or employment and, in the 
case of representations, to have actual or implied authority to make the 
representations.1 The circumstances in which a corporation may be liable for the 
conduct of its agents, employees or directors is broadened under the Australian 
Consumer Law (ACL) to where one of these parties engages in conduct “on behalf 
of” the corporation. As the decision in Bennett v Elysium Noosa Pty Ltd (in liq)2 
demonstrates, this may extend to liability for the misleading conduct of a 
salesperson for the joint venture to parties who are not formal members of the joint 
venture, but where the joint venture activities are within the course of the entity’s 
“business, affairs or activities”. 
 
Factual context 
 
Elysium Noosa is a master-planned community title scheme in Noosa, Queensland. 
The development was undertaken by an unincorporated joint venture between NR 
Nominees Pty Ltd (NR Nominees) and Pearson Property Group (Noosa) Pty Ltd 
(PPG Noosa). These two parties will be referred to collectively as the JV Partners. 
Elysium Noosa Pty Ltd owned the land upon which the development was located. 
Consolo Ltd (Consolo) owned all the shares in NR Nominees which in turn owned 
all the shares in NR Nominees. Consolo also held all of the shareholding in Consolo 
Property Pty Ltd (Consolo Property). Pearson Property Group Pty Ltd (PPG) owned 
all of the shareholding in PPG Noosa. All of the entities, including the JV Partners, 
will be referred to collectively as the JV Consortium. 
 
The case concerned a claim by the buyer of a house in the Elysium Noosa 
development for damages for misleading conduct. The claim was commenced after 
the settlement of the purchase. The buyer, Dr Bennett, claimed that representations 
were made by two marketing agents, Nick and Julieanne Burke (the Burkes), at the 
time of contract. The representations concerned access to amenities also to be 
constructed by the developer and, in particular, a community centre and related 
landscaping and street scaping, which were to be completed in Stage 1 of the 
development. The Burkes were salesperson employed by PRD Nationwide (real 
estate agents), whose company was appointed by Elysium Noosa to market the 
development. 
 
 
 
Dr Bennett entered the contract in early 2005 upon the faith of these oral 
representations and after reading marketing material, and completed the contract in 
March 2008. The court found as a fact that an amended development approval was 
sought from the local authority in late 2004 which omitted mention of the plan for 
the community centre. The local authority confirmed in February 2008, just prior to 
completion in March 2008, that the development approval for the housing scheme 
did not include approval for the community facilities which had been promised to 
the buyer. Furthermore, the court found that as late as early 2008, just prior to 
completion, the developer had no firm plans to proceed with the construction of the 
community facilities. In September 2009, the developer was placed in receivership 
without any of the community facilities having been constructed. In 2010, the buyer 
issued proceedings for damages for misleading or deceptive conduct pursuant to 
what was then s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (now s 18 of the ACL) alleging 
that the lot purchased for $2.1 million was now valued at $900,000.  
  
Did the developer have reasonable grounds for making representations as to the 
construction of the community centre and associated facilities? 
 
Dr Bennett alleged that the Burkes prior to contract had no reasonable grounds to 
make the representations to the effect that the community centre would be 
constructed. This was a representation with respect to a future matter under s 51A(1) 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (now s 4(1) of the ACL). Section 51A provided that 
where a corporation makes a representation with respect to any future matter and 
the corporation does not have reasonable grounds for doing so, the representation 
shall be taken to be misleading. Under s 51A(2) (now  ss 4(2) and (3) of the ACL) the 
corporation shall, unless it adduces evidence to the contrary, be deemed not to have 
had reasonable grounds for making the representation. Following Alsop J in 
McGrath v Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd,3 Reeves J found that the developer 
had adduced “quite extensive evidence directed to showing ‘to the contrary’ of the 
deeming provision in s 51A(2) that the Burkes had reasonable grounds to make the 
representations”.4 
 
Therefore, the automatic deeming provision in s 51A was displaced. Having made 
that finding, Reeves J went on to assess under s 51A(1) whether he was satisfied on 
the balance of probabilities that the Burkes had reasonable grounds to make the 
representations. If his Honour was not so satisfied, the representations would be 
taken to be misleading. This is the position explicitly adopted under s 4(3) of the 
ACL, which provides that the burden of proof under s 4 is evidentiary in nature and 
does not place a legal burden on defendants to prove that representations were not 
misleading. 
 
Justice Reeves found as a fact that, when the representation was made, the 
developer held no development approval for its construction. There were no final 
 
 
plans or drawings prepared, costs estimates for the construction had not gone 
beyond the basic feasibility studies and could not be said to be reliable, and that this 
situation persisted right up until the date of completion of the purchase. In fact, 
Reeves J found that the developer showed no evidence of a “genuine commitment” 
to provide a community centre. Thus, it was held that the real estate agents had no 
reasonable grounds to make the representations that the community centre would be 
constructed contemporaneously with the dwelling as represented. Consequently, the 
statement was misleading. 
 
Were the real estate agents engaged in conduct on behalf of the joint venture?  
 
The Burkes were not employed by the joint venture entities, but employed by an 
independent agency, which was appointed by Elysium Noosa (the owner of the 
land) to be the sole exclusive marketing consultant for the development. The Burkes 
were not parties to the proceedings. To hold the joint venture entities liable for their 
misleading conduct, the buyer had to rely upon the deeming provision in s 84(2) of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (now  replicated in s 139B(2) of the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) which states: 
 
Any conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate: 
(a) by a director, employee or agent of the body corporate within the 
scope of the person’s actual or apparent authority; or 
(b)  by any other person at the direction or with the consent or agreement 
(whether express or implied) of a director, employee or agent of the 
body corporate, where the giving of the direction, consent or 
agreement is within the scope of the actual or apparent authority of 
the director, employee or agent; 
shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to have been engaged in also by 
the body corporate. 
 
Section 84(2) raises two elements for consideration: 
1. Were the Burkes acting on “behalf of” the members of the joint venture? 
2. Were the Burkes acting “at the direction or with the consent or agreement of” the 
members of the joint venture? 
 
On behalf of 
 
Justice Reeves referred to previous authorities that clearly establish s 84 is broader 
than the common law concept of vicarious liability.5 The concept of acting “on 
behalf” of an entity has been held to require “involvement by the person concerned 
with the activities of the company” and the word conveys a similar meaning to the 
phrase “in the course of the body corporate’s affairs or activities”.6 This view was 
expanded upon in NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd7 by Lindgren J who stated 
that: 
 
 
It seems to me that an act is done “on behalf of” a corporation for the purpose 
of s 84(2) if either one of two conditions is satisfied: that the actor engaged in 
the conduct intending to do so “as representative of” or “for” the corporation, 
or that the actor engaged in the conduct in the course of the corporation’s 
business, affairs or activities. [1244] 
 
Justice Reeves, taking these principles into account, applied both a subjective and 
objective test to whether the Burkes were acting on behalf of the joint venture 
partners. First, his Honour concluded that the Burkes subjective intention was to act 
not only on behalf of the JV partners, but also the JV consortium as demonstrated by 
their representations, which included reference to Consolo and PPG, statements in 
the pamphlet given out by the Burkes about the consortium developing the land, 
and their presence in a photo with both a director of PPG (Pearson) and the project 
manager of Consolo Property (Dowling). An objective assessment of the facts 
demonstrated the same conclusion by reference to the fact the development was a 
main part of the business affairs and activities of all members of the JV Consortium.  
 
The wide operation of the phrase “on behalf of” is evident in the conclusions of 
Reeves J: 
 
 So, taking into account the conclusion that the Elysium Noosa development 
was a central and main part of the business, affairs and activities of all of the 
respondents and the conclusion that the Burkes were engaged in an activity 
that was critical to the financial success of that development, I consider, on an 
objective assessment, it can be fairly said that the Burkes were acting “on 
behalf of” the respondent companies within the terms of s 84(2) of the TPA 
when they were engaged in that selling activity.8  
 
It is immaterial, in my view, whether the Burkes were also employed by PRD 
and their selling activities were concurrently being carried out on behalf of 
PRD. It is also immaterial whether anyone at Consolo, or at the Pearson 
companies, was aware that the Burkes were engaged in the selling activities 
on their behalf. Instead, what matters is whether the Burkes’ selling activities, 
when viewed objectively, could be said to be a part of the business, affairs 
and activities of those companies. I do not consider that this conclusion 
strains the expression “on behalf of”, or applies too loose a meaning to it. It is 
consistent, in my view, with casting a wide net and allowing an applicant in 
the position of Dr Bennett, to sheet home responsibility to each of those 
companies, on whose behalf the Burkes were carrying out this critical sales 
activity in the Elysium Noosa development.9 
 
The practical effect of this broad interpretation is that the structure of joint venture 
arrangements will be irrelevant to whether in substance a development, although 
carried out by a subsidiary, is really part of the business affairs and activities of a 
holding or parent corporation. 
 
 
 
At the direction, consent or agreement of 
 
As the real estate agents were never directors, employees or agents of the developer, 
they had to fall into the second category in s 84(2) of acting under the “direction, 
with the consent or agreement of” those parties.  Justice Reeves considered that 
Pearson as a director of PPG, Dowling as project manager for Consolo Property and 
Austin as a director of Consolo, Consolo Property and NR Nominees, had authority 
on behalf of their respective companies to give a direction. Justice Reeves considered 
that the word “direction” should mean to give:   
 
authoritative guidance, instruction ... of keeping in right order; management, 
administration. It follows that the question here can be narrowed to whether 
any of the three men mentioned above gave any authoritative guidance, etc, 
to the Burkes.10 
 
The evidence focussed on the relationship of Pearson with the Burkes. As the person 
responsible for the management of public relations and marketing for the whole 
development on behalf of the JV Consortium, Pearson was involved in instructing 
the Burkes “to ensure that they could answer all questions that may arise” in selling 
the lots in the development. Justice Reeves inferred from this evidence that Pearson 
was among those who required the Burkes to learn “every element of the Elysium 
Project” in his capacity as the manager of public relations and marketing for the 
whole Elysium Noosa development. Based on this evidence, his Honour concluded 
that Pearson gave authoritative guidance and instruction to the Burkes of a kind that 
falls squarely within the ordinary meaning of the word “direction”.  
 
Further on the evidence, his Honour concluded that Pearson was acting both as a 
director of the PPG companies and as agent for the JV Consortium more generally in 
relation to marketing, and had authority on behalf of all parties to direct the work of 
the Burkes.  
 
Damages 
 
The usual measure of damages for awarded by a court where a claimant has entered 
into a contract in reliance on misleading conduct is the difference between the 
contract price and the “real value” at the date of acquisition.11  
 
 Dr Bennett’s counsel submitted that, as this was a “no transaction” case, the court 
should adopt a different measure to put Dr Bennett back in the position he would be 
in if the contract had not been entered into. On this basis, Dr Bennett should be 
compensated for the value of the property at the date of trial as compared to the 
contract price. The JV Consortium, as may be expected, submitted that the usual 
 
 
measure of loss should be adopted, particularly due to several intervening events 
such as the global financial crisis, which impacted on the value of property in Noosa 
generally. 
 
Justice Reeves accepted the submissions of the JV Consortium. Reliance upon HTW 
Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd v Astonland Pty Ltd12 was, rightly, in his Honour’s view 
misconceived. This case examined the question of the valuation of the property and 
the ability of the valuer to take into account events, although coming to fruition after 
the contract was within the knowledge of the parties at the time of contract and 
impacting on the value of the property. The actual measure of loss applied by the 
High Court in this case was the usual measure.  His Honour also rejected reliance on 
the decision in North East Equity Pty Ltd v Proud Nominees Pty Ltd,13 on the basis that 
the decision involved a consideration of a complex situation involving the purchase 
of a carrot processing plant integrated within the claimant’s business. 
 
Justice Reeves acknowledged that the common measure of damages should not be 
rigidly applied and damages may, within the discretion of the court, be calculated at 
a different time if necessary to compensate the claimant. (at [262]) An example of 
such a decision is Mark Bain Constructions Pty Ltd v Avis,14 where the difference 
between the contract price and re-sale price was awarded following misleading 
conduct about the potential view from the property because it continued to impact 
on the value of the unit purchased.  
 
Although arguments were put in relation to the continuing impact of the absence of 
a community centre, his Honour was not convinced that he would be able to 
separate the impact of subsequent events if a later date were adopted. In reliance 
upon the statements by the High Court in Henville v Walker,15 his Honour favoured 
the usual approach of the contract price less the market value at the date of 
acquisition as the appropriate measure, particularly in light of the impact of the 
global financial crisis on the value of property in Noosa. The claimant’s argument 
that in a “no transaction” case all of the loss less the value of the asset at the time of 
trial should be recovered was rejected. Consistent with the view in Street v Luna Park 
Sydney Pty Ltd,16 Reeves J did not consider this was a relevant factor in the 
assessment of damages because this is a claim made by many purchasers in cases 
under s 52. 
 
The date of acquisition was assumed by his Honour to be the date of settlement. The 
value of the property as at the date of settlement was agreed by the parties at $1.6 
million. This resulted in an award of $500,000. 
 
Apportionment 
 
 
 
The final matter considered by Reeves J was the question of apportionment. The 
joint venture parties sought to have the loss apportioned between the various parties 
under the proportionate liability provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (ss 87CB– 
87CI). These provisions are replicated in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. 
Section 87CB of the Trade Practices Act 1974 provided that: 
 
This Part applies to a claim (an apportionable claim) if the claim is a claim for 
damages made under s 82 for:  
(a) economic loss; or 
(b) damage to property 
caused by conduct that was done in contravention of s 52. 
 
Justice Reeves favoured a strict interpretation of the provisions concluding that 
apportionment was not possible for claims under other sections, such as 53A of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974, for economic loss or where the claim was brought under s 
87 for a contravention of s 52. As Dr Bennett’s claim was for compensation under s 
87(1A) for a contravention of s 52 and s 53A, the apportionment provisions did not 
apply. This strict approach has been called into question in Khoury v Sidhu (No 2),17 
which was not considered by his Honour. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The salient point from this decision is that corporations will find it difficult to avoid 
liability for the conduct of agents where, although the corporation did not directly 
appoint the agent, the agent is acting at the behest of a director or duly authorised 
agent of the corporation, to carry out activities that are objectively part of the 
business affairs and activities of that corporation. This is consistent with the trend in 
similar decisions where corporations who outwardly appear to be involved in a 
development have been liable for misleading advertising by other parties.18  
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